

Macroeconomics II

Infinitely lived agents: Variational methods

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1 Infinitely lived agents

Infinitely lived agents

- Why do we use this kind of model
- Do we believe people plan over infinite horizons
 - Many people do have children
 - They care about the children
 - Maybe plan for their dynasty
- Normally, far into the future matters little
 - and we don't know when we will die
- These problems are **Mathematically tractable**
- We first do simple Robinson Crusoe model
 - Why is the Robinson Crusoe novel interesting to economists?
- Then economy with multiple agents and markets

Robinson Crusoe economy

- Only one agent (who we call Robinson Crusoe) with utility

$$\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i u(c_{t+i})$$

- Notice that it is a discounted infinite horizon utility
- Budget constraints

$$k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)k_t + i_t$$

and

$$y_t = f(k_t) \geq c_t + i_t$$

1.1 Solving for stationary state

Variational methods

Solving for a stationary state

1. Assume that values for endogenous variables for periods $s - 1$ and $s + 1$ are known
2. Solve for values in period s
3. Find equilibrium where values for $s - 1$, s , and $s + 1$ are the same
4. This is a stationary state that meets the equilibrium conditions

General framework

- Optimization problem ($F(x_{t+i}, x_{t+1+i})$ is objective function)

$$\max_{\{x_x\}_{s=t}^{\infty}} \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i F(x_{t+i}, x_{t+1+i}).$$

- The Euler condition (a necessary condition)

$$0 = F_2(x_{s-1}, x_s) + \beta F_1(x_s, x_{s+1})$$

- Transversality condition

$$\lim_{s \rightarrow \infty} \beta^s F_1(x_s, x_{s+1}) x_s = 0.$$

Example economy

1. Substitute budget constraints into utility function. Get:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \beta^i u(f(k_{t+i}) - k_{t+i+1} + (1 - \delta)k_{t+i})$$

2. First order conditions are

$$0 = \beta^{s-t} u'(f(k_s) - k_{s+1} + (1 - \delta)k_s) (f'(k_s) + (1 - \delta)) \\ - \beta^{s-t-1} u'(f(k_{s-1}) - k_s + (1 - \delta)k_{s-1}).$$

Example economy (continued)

1. Which can be written as the Euler equation (a necessary condition)

$$f'(k_s) + (1 - \delta) = \frac{u'(f(k_{s-1}) - k_s + (1 - \delta)k_{s-1})}{\beta u'(f(k_s) - k_{s+1} + (1 - \delta)k_s)}.$$

2. In a stationary state, $k_{s+1} = k_s = k_{s-1} = \bar{k}$, so the above becomes

$$f'(\bar{k}) = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta$$

The value of \bar{k} is implicitly defined

3. Savings in a stationary state is $\bar{s} = \delta\bar{k}$

- See book for Robinson Crusoe with labor decision included

Transversality condition

- Transversality condition for example economy

$$\lim_{i \rightarrow \infty} \beta^i u'(f(k_{t+i}) - k_{t+i+1} + (1 - \delta)k_{t+i}) (f'(k_{t+i}) + (1 - \delta)) k_{t+i} = 0.$$

- In a stationary state with $\bar{k} > 0$

$$\begin{aligned} & \lim_{i \rightarrow \infty} \beta^i u'(f(\bar{k}) - \delta\bar{k}) (f'(\bar{k}) + (1 - \delta)) \bar{k} \\ &= \lim_{i \rightarrow \infty} \beta^i u'(f(\bar{k}) - \delta\bar{k}) \left(\frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta + (1 - \delta) \right) \bar{k} \\ &= \lim_{i \rightarrow \infty} \beta^{i-1} u'(f(\bar{k}) - \delta\bar{k}) \bar{k} \rightarrow 0 \end{aligned}$$

- because $u'(f(\bar{k}) - \delta\bar{k}) \bar{k}$ is a finite constant for $\bar{k} > 0$

1.2 Market economy

Competitive market economy

- Many agents
 - Households
 - Firms
- Markets for goods, labor, and rental of capital
- Individual take aggregate values as given
- Decentralized decision making

Competitive market economy

Unit mass of agents

indexed from 0 to 1 continuously

$$H_t = \int_0^1 h_t^i di \text{ and } K_t = \int_0^1 k_t^i di$$

Include individual labor supply decision

$$u(c_t^i, l_t^i) = u(c_t^i, 1 - h_t^i)$$

subject to the budget constraints

$$c_t^i = w_t h_t^i + r_t k_t^i + i_t^i$$

$$k_{t+1}^i = (1 - \delta) k_t^i + i_t^i$$

$$w_t = f_h(K_t, H_t)$$

$$r_t = f_k(K_t, H_t)$$

Set up problem as Lagrange problem

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t^i, 1 - h_t^i) - \lambda_t^1 (k_{t+1}^i - (1 - \delta) k_t^i - i_t^i) - \lambda_t^2 (f_h(K_t, H_t) h_t^i + f_k(K_t, H_t) k_t^i - c_t^i - i_t^i)]$$

- Difference between h_t^i and H_t and k_t^i and K_t
- In optimization, H_t and K_t are considered given
- Equilibrium conditions are applied after optimization

First order conditions

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial L}{\partial c_t^i} &= u_c(c_t^i, 1 - h_t^i) + \lambda_t^2 = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial h_t^i} &= -u_h(c_t^i, 1 - h_t^i) - \lambda_t^2 f_h(K_t, H_t) = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial k_{t+1}^i} &= -\lambda_t^1 + \beta \lambda_{t+1}^1 (1 - \delta) - \beta \lambda_{t+1}^2 f_k(K_{t+1}, H_{t+1}) = 0 \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial i_t^i} &= \lambda_t^1 - \lambda_t^2 = 0 \end{aligned}$$

First order conditions (continued)

These simplify to

$$\begin{aligned} u_c(c_t^i, 1 - h_t^i) &= \lambda_t^1 - \lambda_t^2 \\ \frac{u_h(c_t^i, 1 - h_t^i)}{u_c(c_t^i, 1 - h_t^i)} &= f_h(K_t, H_t) \\ \frac{u_c(c_t^i, 1 - h_t^i)}{u_c(c_{t+1}^i, 1 - h_{t+1}^i)} &= \beta [f_k(K_{t+1}, H_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta)] \end{aligned}$$

For the individual decisions we need to include the budget constraint

$$k_{t+1}^i = (1 - \delta) k_t^i + f_h(K_t, H_t) h_t^i + f_k(K_t, H_t) k_t^i - c_t^i$$

Solving the model

- **After and only after** the individual decision rules are found, can one aggregate across individuals

– Because the K_t and H_t are not controlled by individuals

- These are found from the equilibrium conditions

$$K_t = \int_0^1 k_t^i di$$

$$H_t = \int_0^1 h_t^i di$$

- Aggregation condition for consumption

$$C_t = \int_0^1 c_t^i di$$

Solving the model

- Given that production is homogenous of degree 1

$$f_h(K_t, H_t) H_t + f_k(K_t, H_t) K_t = f(K_t, H_t)$$

- The conditions for equilibrium are

$$\frac{u_h(C_t, 1 - H_t)}{u_c(C_t, 1 - H_t)} = f_h(K_t, H_t)$$

$$\frac{u_c(C_t, 1 - H_t)}{u_c(C_{t+1}, 1 - H_{t+1})} = \beta [f_k(K_{t+1}, H_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta)]$$

and the budget constraint is

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_t + f(K_t, H_t) - C_t$$

The stationary states

- Solving for the stationary states, one gets

$$\frac{u_h(\bar{C}, 1 - \bar{H})}{u_c(\bar{C}, 1 - \bar{H})} = f_h(\bar{K}, \bar{H})$$

$$\frac{1}{\beta} - (1 - \delta) = f_k(\bar{K}, \bar{H})$$

and the budget constraint is

$$f(\bar{K}, \bar{H}) - \delta\bar{K} = \bar{C}$$

The stationary states

- Or, the two equations in H and K of

$$\frac{u_h(f(\bar{K}, \bar{H}) - \delta\bar{K}, 1 - \bar{H})}{u_c(f(\bar{K}, \bar{H}) - \delta\bar{K}, 1 - \bar{H})} = f_h(\bar{K}, \bar{H})$$

$$\frac{1}{\beta} - (1 - \delta) = f_k(\bar{K}, \bar{H})$$

- These are the same two conditions one gets for the Robinson Crusoe economy (with labor decision)

The second welfare theorem

"The Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem. If household preferences and firm production sets are convex, there is a complete set of markets with publicly known prices, and every agent acts as a price taker, then *any Pareto optimal outcome can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium if appropriate lump-sum transfers of wealth are arranged.*"

- What does the Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem mean?
 - A perfectly competitive economy can be solved as a social planner (one person) problem
 - This need not work if the economy is not perfectly competitive
- The above statement is for a finite dimension economy. Infinite dimensioned economies are a bit more complicated. More assumptions are needed to get competitive equilibrium. We assume a competitive equilibrium exists

Homework

- Exercise: Find the stationary state equilibrium for an economy with

$$u(c_t^i, 1 - h_t^i) = \log c_t^i + A \log(1 - h_t^i),$$

$A = 1.72$, and

$$f(K_t, H_t) = \gamma K_t^\theta H_t^{1-\theta}$$

with $\gamma = 3$ and $\theta = .56$. Use $\beta = .98$ and $\delta = .06$. Find the numerical values of output, consumption, the capital stock, and labor supply in the stationary state using Matlab.