Seminarios JILAEE U Chicago UCEMA

A partir de una inciativa conjunta con The University of Chicago,los seminarios tienen por objeto crear un espacio para presentar y analizar investigaciones experimentales con foco en los pa√≠ses latinoamericanos que ofrezcan nuevas perspectivas en √°reas como la educaci√≥n, la provisi√≥n privada de bienes p√ļblicos, las preferencias sociales y la econom√≠a ambiental.

Las presentaciones est√°n dirigidas al p√ļblico en general y ser√°n impartidos por investigadores y especialistas visitantes.

Fecha Hora Expositor/Institución Título
15/05 16 h Dr. Mariano Tommasi (Universidad de San Andrés)

Seminario JILAEE U Chicago UCEMA: COVID-19 and social protection of poor and vulnerable groups un Latin America.

La protección social de los sectores más vulnerables en Latinoamérica frente al contexto de la pandemia

El seminario será dictado en inglés.


Dr. Mariano Tommasi:Tiene un Doctorado en Economía de la Universidad de Chicago. Es Profesor Plenario del Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de San Andrés y director del Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Humano, ambos en Argentina. Es Fellow de la Econometric Society. Se especializa en economía política, economía institucional, pobreza y políticas

17/07 15 h Martín Rossi (Universidad de San Andrés)

Seminario JILAEE U Chicago UCEMA: Dishonesty and Public Employment.

We study the link between dishonesty and selection into public employment. When military conscription was mandatory in Argentina, eligibility was determined by a lottery and by a medical examination. In order to avoid conscription, drafted individuals had strong incentives to cheat in their medical examination. These incentives varied with the lottery number. Exploiting this exogenous variation in the propensity to engage in dishonest behavior during early adulthood (the “impressionable” years), we find that individuals with higher probability of having cheated in their health checks as young adults also show higher propensity to become public employees later in life.

Paper en colaboración con Guillermo Cruces y Ernesto Schargrodsky

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Mart√≠n Rossi:Doctor en Econom√≠a por la Universidad de Oxford (2004). Actualmente es Profesor Asociado y Vicerrector de la Universidad de San Andr√©s. Se especializa en econom√≠a del crimen, political economy y econom√≠a p√ļblica, focaliz√°ndose en pa√≠ses en desarrollo. Su labor acad√©mica ha sido publicada en revistas nacionales e internacionales, incluyendo Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics Studies, Economic Journal, Journal of Public Economics y American Economic Journal. Ha sido asesor de diversos gobiernos de Latinoam√©rica y √Āfrica, como as√≠ tambi√©n de organismos internacionales como el Banco Mundial, el Banco de Asia de Desarrollo, el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y UNICEF.

31/07 15 h María Lombardi (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)

Seminario JILAEE U Chicago UCEMA: Will you marry me, later? Age-of-marriage laws and child marriage in Mexico.

We provide empirical evidence on the impact of raising the minimum age of marriage to 18 years old on child marriage, early motherhood, and school enrollment in Mexico. Using a difference-in-differences model that takes advantage of the staggered adoption of this reform across states, we show that banning child marriage leads to a large and statistically significant reduction in the number of registered child marriages. However, we find no effect on school enrollment or early fertility rates. We also find that for girls who give birth before the age of 18, the reduction in the share that are formally married is offset by an increase in the share in informal unions. These findings suggest that when informal unions are a viable option for young couples, raising the minimum age of marriage is not enough to prevent early unions and their negative consequences.

Paper en colaboración con Cristina Belles-Obrero (University of Mannheim)

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Mar√≠a Lombardi:PhD en Econom√≠a en la Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Profesora en la Escuela de Gobierno de la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella e investigadora en CEPE Di Tella. Antes de incorporarse a la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, trabaj√≥ como profesora e investigadora en la Universidad de Gotemburgo. Su investigaci√≥n se enfoca en estudiar el impacto de pol√≠ticas p√ļblicas en pa√≠ses en desarrollo, principalmente en el sector educativo.

21/08 15 h Flavio Cuhna (Rice University)

Seminario JILAEE U Chicago UCEMA:Promoting Early Language Development

El objetivo principal de la Iniciativa es dise√Īar experimentos de campo para ofrecer nuevas perspectivas en diversas √°reas de investigaci√≥n econ√≥mica para pa√≠ses de Am√©rica Latina, como educaci√≥n, provisi√≥n privada de bienes p√ļblicos, preferencias sociales, econom√≠a ambiental.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Favio Cunha:Professor of Economics. He received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 2007 and taught at the University of Pennsylvania before joining the economics faculty at Rice. His areas of expertise are labor economics with special emphasis on human capital formation. He was recently awarded the Econometric Society's Frisch Medal for "Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation," a paper published in Econometrica that he wrote with Dr. James Heckman and Dr. Susanne M. Schennach.

04/09 15 h Sebastian Gallegos(BID)

JILAEE U Chicago UCEMA: Increasing the Take-up of Public Health Services: Evidence from a Digital-Health Field Experiment in Uruguay

In this paper we test whether the promotion of digital government tools and the provision of behaviorally-informed messages increases take-up of medical visits for cervical cancer screening. Using a multi-arm field experiment at scale in Uruguay, and administrative records from national health services, we find that the intervention more than doubled medical appointments and attendance rates over a 12-week period. Most of the effects are driven by women encouraged to use digital government tools on top of behaviorally oriented messages. These women attended the screening appointments about 3 times more than the control group, while those motivated only with messages attended 1.5 times more. Our results highlight the potential of investing in digital government tools to decrease transactions costs and improve the take-up of public services.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Sebasti√°n Gallegos:is a Research Economist at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC. He works with the Strategic Planning and Development Effectiveness Office, and is a Research Fellow at the Behavioral Economics Working Group. Sebastian uses economic models, field experiments and big data to study behavioral and human capital topics.?He is also on the Scientific Committee of the new LACEA BRAIN Network and member of the University of Chicago HCEO working group.He was a Postdoctoral Scholar and Lecturer at Princeton University, with the Department of Economics. Sebastian earned his PhD at The University of Chicago Harris School with a field specialization at the Department of Economics, taught by Jim Heckman, Bob LaLonde, and Dan Black.

25/09 15 h Andrés Gago (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella)

Seminario JILAEE UChicago UCEMA: Confrontation Costs in Negotiations: Bargaining Under the Veil of a Screen.

In negotiations the objectives of parties are generally in conflict. Facing this conflict can trigger negative emotions, such as nervousness, embarrassment and awkwardness, which I refer to as confrontation costs. In this paper, I use a lab experiment to explore whether these costs exist and if so what their implications are. First, I show that a significant proportion of participants avoid bargaining even when it delivers higher payoffs. I find that the avoidance rate is 56% higher in face-to-face negotiations than in electronic negotiations. Second, after shutting down alternative channels, I find that the higher avoidance rate in person can be attributed to higher confrontation costs. Together, these two things make e-negotiations welfare-improving in my design, casting doubts on the general belief that face-to-face communication increases efficiency by fostering transactions. Finally, consistent with previous literature, I observe that women haggle less than men, and I find that confrontation costs can also account for this fact.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Andrés Gago:Andrés Gago is an applied microeconomist with special interest in experimental and behavioral economics. He has worked on gender, fairness, and confrontation costs. He is currently and Assistant Professor at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. He holds PhD from CEMFI.

02/10 15 h Michael Kuhn

Seminario JILAEE UChicago UCEMA: Behavioral food subsidies.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Michael Kuhn:Department of Economics, University of Oregon

09/10 15 h Benedetta Lerva

Seminario JILAEE UChicago UCEMA: Quantifying Externalities in Technology Adoption: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Farmers.

I investigate how positive externalities contribute to underadoption of agricultural technology among sub-Saharan African farmers.Understanding whether and which types of externalities affect adoption is important both to shed light on human behavior and to formulate optimal policies regarding subsidies and targeting. I focus on the adoption of pest-control technologies. A farmer can benefit in two ways if another adopts: i) she can learn about the technology, a knowledge externality and ii) she can face a lower infection probability, a contagion externality. My approach develops in four steps. First, I measure the value farmers attach to adopting pest-control technologies, and establish that pest-control technologies are desired. Second, I measure the value a farmer attaches to another farmer adopting pest control technologies, and document that farmers anticipate positive spillovers. Third, I show that farmers are responsive to changes in positive externalities. I generate random variation in a farmer's beliefs over knowledge and contagion externalities and find changes in beliefs affect the value she assigns to others' adoption. Finally, I estimate that the private benefit of technology adoption is lower than the cost of the technology, but the social benefit is larger than the cost. My results support the view that local economies may be caught in a low-adoption equilibrium which hinders agricultural productivity growth.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Benedetta Lerva:Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University.

16/10 15 h Guilherme Lichand

Seminario JILAEE UChicago UCEMA: Arm-Wrestling in the Classroom: The Non-Monotonic Effects of Monitoring Teachers.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Guilherme Lichand:Department of Economics,University of Zurich.

30/10 15 h Simeon Andreas Schachtele

Seminario JILAEE UChicago UCEMA: Simeon Andreas Schachtele (Inter-American Development Bank)

Policy impact assessment and behavior analysis, in public finance, labor markets or experimental and quasi-experimental health designs based on machine learning and qualitative methods with an emphasis on Latin America, North America, the Middle East and Europe.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Simeon Andreas Schachtele:Postdoctoral Visiting Scholar at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), in the Departments of Research and Institutions for Development. Ph.D. in Economics (U Erlangen-Nuremberg, joint program with LMU Munich) after an M.Sc. in Cognitive & Decision Sciences (University College London) and a B.A. in International Relations (TU Dresden).

06/11 15 h Jose-Alberto Guerra (Universidad de los Andes)

Seminario JILAEE UChicago UCEMA: Valuing personal safety and the gender earnings gap

Can personal traits and safety perception determine gender differences in willingness to pay (WTP) for safer jobs? Using a lab experiment, we elicit a person's WTP for an early (perceived safer) shift and study the role of behavioral preferences and safety perception in explaining occupational segregation in the labor market. We find that women are more willing to forego earnings for personal safety than men, and safety concerns are the main mechanism explaining this difference. The gender gap is robust to controlling for commuting patterns, information provision about crime, victimization, risk, ambiguity, and loss aversion. Controlling for individual exposure to crime reduces the observed gender gap. Thus, policies focused on reducing gender disparities in safety concerns may have a potential effect on women's labor supply decisions.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Jose-Alberto Guerra:Department of Economics,Universidad de los Andes

20/11 15 h Stanislao Maldonado (Universidad del Rosario,Bogot√°)

Seminario JILAEE UChicago UCEMA:Understanding Prosocial Motivation in Developing State Bureaucracies: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Prosocial drivers of human motivation have recently attracted the attention of scholars interested in improving civil servant performance in developing countries. Unfortunately, the existing literature is unclear about which drivers are more relevant to motivate public officials in these settings. We implement a field experiment that varies the salience of different dimensions of prosocial motivation to enforce policy compliance among civil servants from a school maintenance program in Peru. In particular, we study the role of altruism, commitment to a mission, and identity in a large-scale intervention to induce civil servants to invest school maintenance funds and report the use of monetary transfers to monitor corruption. We find that commitment to a mission and identity are cost-effective ways to promote policy compliance, whereas altruism does not play a role in this regard. Our results highlight the importance of a better understanding of the role of different sources of prosocial motivation of civil servants in settings where the state lacks institutional mechanisms to enforce compliance.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Stanislao Maldonado:Assistant Professor in Economics at the Department of Economics at the Universidad del Rosario, in Bogota, Colombia. He specializes in development economics and political economy, and their links with behavioral economics. He teaches quantitative methods and behavioral economics and holds a Ph.D. in Agricultural and Resource Economics from the University of California at Berkeley. He is currently involved in field experiments in Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru on issues of state capacity, social services for conflict-affected populations, and the use of behavioral insights to improve civil servants performance in weak institutional environments.

04/12 15 h Alexia Delfino (Bocconi University)

Breaking Gender Barriers: Bringing Men into the Pink-Collar Jobs of the Future

Traditionally female-dominated sectors are growing while traditionally male-dominated sectors are shrinking. And yet, sectorial male shares are not changing accordingly. Why don't men enter female-dominated occupations? I study men's selection into social work, a fast-growing occupation where the share of men has historically been below 25 percent. I embed a field experiment in the UK-wide recruitment of social workers to analyze barriers to men's entry and the nature of men's sorting into this occupation. I modify the content of recruitment messages to potential applicants to exogenously vary two key drivers of selection: perceived gender shares and expectations of returns to ability. I find that perceived gender shares do not affect men's applications. Increasing expected returns to ability encourages men to apply and improves the average quality of the applicants. This allows the employer to select more talented male hires, who consistently perform better on the job and are not more likely to leave vis-√°-vis men with lower expected returns to ability. I conclude by checking for a trade-off between men's entry and women's exit, both at hiring and on-the-job, to assess the net impact of different recruitment messages for the employer.

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Alexia Delfino:Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at Bocconi University.She is an applied micro-economist with interests in organizational, development and behavioral economics. Alexia received my PhD in Economics from the London School of Economics in May 2020. She is affiliated to: IGIER, IZA and LEAP.

11/12 15 h Francesco Amodio (Department of Economics, McGill Univeristy)

Seminario JILAEE UChicago UCEMA: Labor Market Power, Selection and Informality in Peru

When employers face little competition for labor, i.e., have labor market power, they can suppress wages below marginal productivity. Labor market power and its consequences have rarely been studied in low-income countries, despite substantial labor market frictions affecting competition among employers and large informality levels affecting the workers’ employment opportunities. This paper studies the scope and implications of labor market power in Peru. Using firm and household-level data, we document variation over time in the extent of concentration across local labor markets and workers’ transition between informal and formal sectors. We show that when labor market concentration is high, wages are low for both formal employees and informal self-employed. Moreover, informal self-employment rates are more extensive, and average skill levels are lower in both the formal and informal sectors. We present a general equilibrium model where labor market power results from (i) worker selection across formal employment and informal self-employment and (ii) labor market concentration. The theory highlights the equilibrium relationship between labor market power, informality, wages, and income. When there is selection, labor market concentration has a non-linear relationship with labor market power and ambiguous implications on productivity and wage dispersion.

"Labor Market Power, Selection and Informality in Peru" joint with Pamela Medina-Quispe and Monica Morlacco

El Seminario se dictará en inglés sin traduccción simultánea


Francesco Amodio:Associate Professor at McGill University in Montreal, jointly appointed by the Department of Economics and the Institute for the Study of International Development. He earned his Ph.D. in Economics from Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona in 2015. He is an applied microeconomist with a strong interest in labor economics and its intersection with development and political economy. His current research focuses on management practices, internal labor markets, and accessibility of markets for firms in developing countries. He is also interested in the political economy of conflict and labor markets.