Leftist governments tend to pursue policies that favor labor over capital, which has led to the claim that such policies negatively impact net capital inflows. However, empirical evidence supporting this claim is limited. In a sample of Latin American countries for the period 1996-2020, I find that net capital inflows as a percentage of GDP are on average one percentage point lower during leftist governments than during centrist ones when both types of governments are unified (i.e., the party in control of the executive also holds a majority of seats in the legislature). However, capital inflows do not seem to respond to executive’s ideology when governments are divided. This suggests that investors may perceive divided governments as a guarantee of policy stability, regardless of the executive’s ideology. Consequently, there is no incentive for investors to alter their investment decisions. My findings remain statistically significant across a range of sensitivity checks and extensions. These include incorporating populist governments, identified using GPT classifiers based on established definitions of populism; alternative estimation methods; and an unsupervised machine learning technique for regrouping Latin American countries into different samples. I also highlight the advantages of using the political variables constructed in this paper over institutional quality indices to study capital inflows dynamics.