Energy subsidies persist worldwide despite a broad consensus that they are fiscally costly, poorly targeted, and environmentally distortive. One explanation is political: incumbents may expect electoral rewards for granting them and punishment for removing them, yet the magnitude of these returns is poorly understood. This paper estimates the causal electoral effect of a salient energy subsidy by exploiting the 2021 extension of Argentina's Cold Zone Law, which enlarged a residential gas subsidy in the middle of a legislative election year, cutting bills by 30–50% for roughly three million new customers. Because the newly covered area follows a bio-climatic map drawn years before the reform, the boundary provides quasi-random variation in subsidy status across electoral circuits. Using a geographic regression discontinuity design, I compare the change in the vote share of the policy-associated Kirchnerist/Peronist alliance between the 2017 and 2021 general legislative elections on either side of the new border. Newly subsidised circuits increased their support for the incumbent alliance by roughly five percentage points relative to circuits that remained excluded. The results point to a sizable electoral reward that helps explain why energy subsidies persist.

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