An Economic Theory of Autocracy
Since the pioneering works of Anthony Downs (1957), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), and William Riker (1962) most of the public choice literature have been developed under a democratic framework. These works, which are based upon the assumptions of utility maximization and rationality of the individual voters, present testable theories of political behavior.
See Chapters
Portada (link)
Chapter I - Introduction (link)
Chapter II - The First Building Block: Tullock´s Framework (link)
Chapter III - The Second Building Block: The Civilian Side of the Coup (link)
Chapter IV - The Civilian´s Motivation: A Bentleys Approach to Public Policy (link)
Chapter V - An Illustration: The Argentine Case (link)
Chapter VI - Summary and Conclusions (link)
Appendix 1 - A Bentley´s Approach to Public Policy (link)
Appendix 2 - An Illustration: The Argentine Case (link)
Appendix 3 - Some Further Insights (link)