Our aim is to answer: What are the average efficiency levels of the Argentine labor courts and how do they behave individually with respect to the average? Which are the determinants of the relative efficiency levels of those courts? Are there opportunities to introduce incentives which increase the efficiency of the courts? In doing so we estimate a Data Envelopment Analysis efficiency frontier, and in a second stage we analyze the efficiency scores drivers and the Judiciary career incentives. Our sample are 80 courts during the period 2006-2012.Our findings are of average high levels of efficiency, nonetheless with room for improvements of 9 to 12 percent the output with the same inputs on average, whether variable or constant returns are considered, respectively, The efficiency results take into account caseload and backlog. No measure of capital input is used, thus the analysis is for the short run. The analysis of the efficiency scores against its determinants shows that more variables, outside our sample, are playing a role to explain the variance of the scores. Incentives of Judiciary careers, on the other hand, seem more clearly explained from out data.

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