In 1891, Baron Maurice de Hirsch founded the Jewish Colonization Association (J.C.A.), through which he would manage a gigantic social welfare project concerning the immigration of thousands of people from the Russian Empire towards Argentina, and their settlement in agricultural colonies. In this paper, we evaluate the result of this project, which is generally qualified as a failure by historians on the subject.

En la Argentina de hoy resulta indispensable que el Estado asista a una gran parte de la población; sin embargo, el trabajo social carece, en el largo plazo, de sentido a no ser que mediante el mismo se incentive a aquellos que son asistidos a valerse por si mismos. De lo contrario se estaría condenando a los beneficiarios a la virtual indigencia, al indirectamente perpetuarlos fuera de la sociedad productiva.

En la Argentina de hoy resulta indispensable que el Estado asista a una gran parte de la población; sin embargo, el trabajo social carece, en el largo plazo, de sentido a no ser que mediante el mismo se incentive a aquellos que son asistidos a valerse por si mismos. De lo contrario se estaría condenando a los beneficiarios a la virtual indigencia, al indirectamente perpetuarlos fuera de la sociedad productiva.

In Argentina today it has become essential for the State to provide assistance to a large portion of the population; nevertheless, this social work lacks purpose unless it is used to encourage those who are assisted to fend for themselves. Otherwise, the beneficiaries would be condemned to virtual indigence, as they would be indirectly excluded from productive society.

La hipótesis de eficiencia del mercado de capitales sostiene que los precios de los activos incorporan rápidamente toda la información relevante, por ello su comportamiento puede ser representado por un random walk, al ajustarse instantáneamente ante la aparición de nueva información, la cual, por definición, es incierta e impredecible.

La hipótesis de eficiencia del mercado de capitales sostiene que los precios de los activos incorporan rápidamente toda la información relevante, por ello su comportamiento puede ser representado por un random walk, al ajustarse instantáneamente ante la aparición de nueva información, la cual, por definición, es incierta e impredecible.

It is usually asserted that political instability significantly lowers private investment, as well as economic growth, since it has adverse influence on property rights, and by that on investment and growth (i.e, Robert Barro, 1991; Ross Levine & David Renelt, 1992; Paolo Mauro, 1994; Edgardo Zablotsky, 1994).

This paper studies the relation between the marginalist revolution and the use of the mathematical method in economics. A first version of this work was written as a term paper when I was a student of George Stigler at the University of Chicago. The present version has been benefitted from his comments and suggestions, as well as from the original bibliographical references provided by professor Stigler.

This paper postulates the hypothesis that the stability of the rules under which compete the different interest groups is a relevant consideration to explain economic growth; under this hypothesis it is possible to propose indices that may capture the degree of stability of the rules of the redistributive game better than the usual measures of political stability.

This paper is concerned with the role played by the size of an interest group in the production of collective political pressure, and with its success in the redistribution of political income.

Most of the regulation literature sustains the hypothesis that the optimal size of an interest group is somewhat small. This support can be traced back as early as 1908 when The Process of Government, seminal book written by Arthur Bentley, was first published.