Introduction

This paper examines a neglected economic phenomenon - the impact of inflation on the structure and inequality of wages. There is little evidence for the nonneutrality of inflation on income and earnings of individuals; however, the goal of lowering inflation rates seems to be the most important one in countries that experience even a moderate level of inflation. This goal, moreover, seems to be associated with a goal to improve income distribution².

"Besides number and intensity, there is a technique of group activities which must be taken into account. Blows, bribes, allurements of one kind and another, and arguments also, are characteristic, and to these must be added organization. A group will differentiate under fitting circumstances a special set of activities for carrying on its work. We must learn how these specialized activities vary under different forms of group opposition, how the technique changes and evolve.

This paper postulates the hypothesis that the stability of the rules under which different interest groups compete is a relevant consideration for explaining economic growth. Under this hypothesis, it is possible to propose indices that may capture the degree of stability of the rules of the redistributive game better than the usual measures of political stability.

El sindicato constituyó en sus orígenes el centro predominante de la vida laboral y aún social de los trabajadores. Ya en la óptica de los influyentes socialistas británicos Sidney y Beatrice Webb se visualizaba el sindicato, a principios de siglo, como a la institución que aglutinaba a los trabajadores con el fin de obtener, a través de la unión, mejoras imposibles de alcanzar por la acción individual de los trabajadores. Sin embargo, no existe unanimidad, y ni siquiera consenso, respecto de qué es en realidad un sindicato.

This paper asks why trade unions' stabilization policy can be colored by political considerations, as suggested for example by Argentina's history of bitter divisions over Peronism. Wage decisions are considered as part of a game between the government and trade unions, where income distribution can be altered by political parties and a successful stabilization program increases the chances the incumbent will be reelected. The main result is that trade unions may cooperate with a friendly government, and harass a non-friendly government, in a polarized political climate.

This paper estimates the returns to education in Greater Buenos Aires from 1986 to 1993. It uses the Mincer wage equation for men aged 25 to 54 who were employed during the survey period. The data are derived from tapes of the Permanent Household Survey, comprising approximately 15,000 individuals and subsamples of around 2,000 men.