This paper sets forth a new approach to state-owned banks grounded on portfolio theory and the principle of subsidiarity, so as to improve the governance of such institutions. Firstly, it defines what is meant by portfolio of portfolios and the separation feature, which leads to setting up what we call a separation compact. Next, the principle of subsidiarity is introduced, highlighting the pathways to its uses and misuses when we deal with state-owned banks.

El título de este ejercicio remeda una antigua nota que escribí para La Nación, en 1983, con motivo de una de las tantas reformas nominales de la moneda. En aquella oportunidad la nota se titulaba  “La reforma del peso o lo difícil que es reducir la inflación en 99,99%” y se refería a la reforma nominal de la moneda que introdujo al Peso Argentino en lugar del Peso Ley quitándoles cuatro ceros a la unidad monetaria vigente hasta entonces. En aquella nota decía:”…El cambio de unidad monetaria sólo significará que todas las variables nominales de la economía se dividirán por 10.000.

State-owned enterprises set a clear example of a mixed governance, in which the public and private realms blend together to bring about a complex structure we are going to define as dual governance. This paper puts forward a new design of governance for state-owned banks. Firstly, the whole subject is framed within the transaction costs approach to financial intermediation. Next, we move on to the formal governance of state-owned banks.

The traditional marshallian rule of investing (abandoning) when the value of an underlying asset is above (below) the cost of an alternative investment is modified in the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility giving rise to an option component into decisions. This component is affected by the degree of volatility of underlying assets, which in turn can derive their volatility from the economy as a whole, affecting the investment process and therefore the accumulation of capital and future growth.

La tradicional regla marshalliana de inversión (o abandono) cuando un activo vale mas (menos) que una inversión alternativa es modificada en situaciones de incertidumbre e irreversibilidad, generando un componente de opción.

Este trabajo desarrolla un modelo para estimaciones de sistemas de demanda, cuyos coeficientes son elasticidades-precio marshalianas directas y elasticidades de sustitución entre bienes. El modelo satisface las restricciones de homogeneidad, simetría y, eventualmente, aditividad surgidas de la teoría del consumidor, y es útil principalmente para estimar demandas de varios bienes de la misma industria o grupo de productos. Las características del modelo se comparan con las de otras alternativas existentes (sistemas logarítmicos, translogarítmicos, AIDS y QUAIDS).

In 1940 Argentina had a per capita income and a degree of social development that placed her among the most ‘advanced’ countries in the world.1 By 1970 she was already a wellestablished member of the Third World. Argentina's decline, or as some wit once aptly put it, ‘the miracle of Argentine under development’, has led to the formulation of a constellation of explanations, none too satisfactory.

La noción de racionalidad es una de las más básicas y utilizada en los análisis económicos y de toma de decisiones empresariales. Pero también es una de las más controvertidas. La noción más tradicional de racionalidad en la ciencia económica, también identificada como “racionalidad clásica o neoclásica”, basada en la tradición de Hume, se refería a la manera óptima de utilizar medios para alcanzar determinados fines sin entrar a analizar ni la calidad o “racionalidad” de los medios y tanto menos de los fines.

This paper argues that compliance risk and the compliance function are powerful tools for enhancing corporate governance, not only in banks but in any other organization as well. First, it reviews the contribution made by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which pertains only to financial institutions. Next, it asserts that compliance risk is indeed important in any corporate governance environment. Afterward, it examines how the compliance function can be shaped to grant, on the one hand, its own independence and, on the other, clearly defined patterns of accountability.

Whathappenstojobmarketsignaling under two-dimensional asymmetric information? With 2 types of productivity and noise, the equilibrium remains separating if an extended single-crossing condition is satis ed. If not, there are partially pooling equilibria where only extreme types can be distinguished, and supplementary information is needed. On-the-job interaction gives employers private information on productivity, which employment relationships may reveal to the market.